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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
YOSIF B. ABDULKADIR, and PAM-
ELA SUSAN ABDULKADIR, an in-
fant, and PATRICIA FATIN AB-
DULKADIR, an infant, by Yosif B. 
ABDULKADIR, their Guardian, Ad 
Litem, 
Plaintiffs and App,ellants, 
vs. 
THE WESTERN PACIFIC RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
8677 
This suit was commenced April 14, 1956, to recover 
damages for the death of LaMay R. Abdulkadir. Extensive 
pretrial discovery was employed by counsel for both parties 
including the taking of depositions of all known witnesses 
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and a series of written interrogatories. Approximately one 
year after the action was filed, the case was submitted to 
the trial court on the motion of defendant for summary 
judgment. The trial judge heard arguments of counsel, 
took the matter under advisement, and on the 20th day of 
April, 1957, entered an order granting defendant's motion 
for summary judgment. This appeal followed. "R" refers 
to pages of the depositions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The accident out of which this suit arose occurred on 
the defendant's main line track at approximately 11 :40 
p. m. on the 18th day of July, 1955. The atmosphere was 
clear. At the point of the accident, defendant's main line 
running east and west is paralleled on the north by a siding 
track. The main line from this point is paralleled by U. S. 
Highway 40 for several miles to the east and to the west. 
There is a narrow abandoned roadway approximately eight 
feet in width crossing defendant's tracks at the point where 
plaintiff's intestate was struck. The only structure in the 
vicinity of the crossing is a small wooden building located 
south of the track. Persons approaching the old road cross-
ing, as plaintiff and his wife were doing on the fatal night, 
have an unobstructed view up and down the track for many 
miles. The diagram attached as Exhibit "A" which has been 
prepared from the testimony and admitted facts accurately 
reflects the physical surroundings of the accident site. 
Shortly before the accident, plaintiff had been proceed-
ing west on Highway 40 towards Wendover. In order to 
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get off of the traveled portion of the highway to change 
a tire, he pulled his automobile onto the side road to the 
south of the highway and stopped with the front of the 
automobile facing defendant's tracks and approximately 
66 feet north of the siding track. After the tire had been 
changed, it became necessary for plaintiff's wife to relieve 
herself and in order to secure privacy and shelter the two 
decided to proceed south along the abandoned road across 
the tracks. Before starting out, plaintiff testified that he 
I 
turned on the high beam of his headlights which cast a beam 
of light down the old roadway and across the tracks (R. 
16). Upon leaving the car plaintiff could see the passing 
track and told his wife that they would have to cross a rail-
road track (R. 17). Upon crossing the siding track, plain-
tiff and his wife noticed the main line (R. 19). It was 
plaintiff's testimony that he and his wife before crossing 
the main line were "noticing both sides to see if the train 
was coming" (R. 19) but failed to see or hear the approach-
ing train (R. 19, 23, 24). Plaintiff's intestate was follow-
ing one step behind him and a little to the right (R. 23). 
When plaintiff was between the tracks on the main line, 
he looked up, saw the light of the train, yelled to his wife, 
and made a single jump to safety (R. 22, 23). His wife, 
however, was struck and killed before she could reach the 
south side of the track. Plaintiff referred to the light on 
the train as "a very strong light" (R. 24) about 6 feet off 
of the ground (R. 25) which he saw for the first time only 
a few feet from him (R. 24, 25) . 
Following the accident, plaintiff went to the head of 
the train and observed the light which he described as a 
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"very bright light," (R. 50) and he thought that the engi-
neer had forgotten to switch from the high to the low beam 
when the train was brought to a stop (R. 49-52). 
The only known witnesses to the accident are plaintiff, 
Mr. Abdulkadir; the engineer, Mr. Harry Fuller, and the 
fireman, Mr. Sam Steele, Jr. The fireman and engineer 
were in the cab of the train at the time of the collision. 
Depositions of each of these three men were taken and filed 
with the court. 
It appears from defendant's evidence that just prior 
to the accident the train was traveling 79 miles per hour 
(R. 63). The engineer and fireman based their statement 
as to speed on observance of the speed recorder in the cab 
of the engine and a speed tape permanently recording the 
speed of the train. Plaintiff estimated the speed of the 
train to be 90 miles per hour from the sound of the wheels 
as it passed him (R. 36). A whistle was sounded as the 
train approached, approximately a mile or 3,4 of a mile 
distant (R. 66). The light of the train was on full beam 
and cast light down the track in front of the train about 
800 feet (R. 68). Despite the unobstructed view up the 
track, plaintiff failed to see the light until the train was 
upon him (R. 34). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF FACT TO BE 
TRIED BY A JURY. 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO JUDG-
MENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT DENIED ANY OF 
THEIR RIGHTS BY THE ENTRY OF THE 
JUDGMENT BELOW. 
POINT IV 
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE, INCLUDING 
PLAINTIFF'S OWN TESTIMONY, COMPELS 
THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DECEASED 
WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. THERE 
WAS, THEREFORE, NO GENUINE ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT TO BE TRIED BY A JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF FACT TO BE 
TRIED BY A JURY. 
Plaintiff asserts that he has been denied his constitu-
tional right of trial by jury and that Rule 39, U. R. C. P. 
has not been complied with. There is no constitutional right 
to trial by jury in a civil case. Rule 39 provides for trial 
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of issues of fact by a jury upon proper demand. The trial 
court by its order granting the motion for summary judg-
ment found that there were no material issues of fact to 
be tried. The only issue on this appeal is whether or not, 
in view of the admitted facts, there was a genuine issue of 
material fact to be tried by a jury. This is discussed under 
Point IV infra. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO JUDG-
MENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff urges that defendant was not entited to judg-
ment because the Complaint states a cause of action and 
plaintiff has not admitted contributory negligence. Defen-
dant's position is, and the court found, that the depositions 
and other papers on file conclusively show, that the deced-
ent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. If this is true, none of the other prospective issues in 
the lawsuit are material. This simply emphasizes the point 
heretofore made that the only genuine issue on this appeal 
is whether or not the trial court properly found. that there 
was no genuine issue of material fact. We submit that the 
trial judge properly decided the motion under Rule 56 which 
provides that: 
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on 
file, together vvith the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judg·ment as a 
matter of law." 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT DENIED ANY OF 
THEIR RIGHTS BY THE ENTRY OF THE 
JUDGMENT BELOW. 
Unless there was some material issue of fact to be tried, 
plaintiffs had no right to require the time and expense of 
a trial. It is enough to say that the question of contributory 
negligence is conclusively resolved by the testimony of plain-
tiff himself. 
Plaintiff asserts that considerable effort has been made 
to locate a certain witness who it is claimed was on the 
scene at the time of the accident. Although it has been over 
two years since the occurrence of the accident, plaintiff 
has had no success with his· attempt to locate this witness. 
No offer has been made to show what the testimony of 
this witness would be. It is obvious, however, that no living 
person was in a better position to see and hear what hap-
pened than was plaintiff who was only a step away from 
deceased when she was killed. 
The depositions of defendant's employees gave an ac-
count of the accident very similar to that given by plaintiff. 
There is no substantial dispute of fact so far as the issue of 
contributory negligence is concerned. Insofar as there may 
be a dispute, plaintiff's version will be accepted for pur-
poses of considering the propriety of the court's ruling. 
POINT IV 
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE, INCLUDING 
PLAINTIFF'S OWN TESTIMONY, COMPELS 
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THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DECEASED 
WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. THERE 
WAS, THEREFORE, NO GENUINE ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT TO BE TRIED BY A JURY. 
If, as the court found, the deceased was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law, the motion for 
summary judgment was properly granted. Contributory 
negligence is a complete defense in this jurisdiction avail-
able against the heirs in a wrongful death suit. Van Wag-
oner v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 112 Utah 189, 
186 P. 2d 293, Reh. 112 Utah 218, 189 P. 2d 701. If the de-
fense is established as a matter of law, as it was in the case 
at bar, the other issues (negligence and damages) are not 
material. 
In the instant case the testimony of all known eye 
witnesses was taken by deposition and published at the 
hearing on defendant's motion. The important facts bear-
ing on the issue of contributory negligence came from the 
mouth of plaintiff himself who was closest on the scene of 
any person now living. We think this evidence clearly shows 
that the deceased failed to exercise that degree of care 
required for her own safety in crossing defendant's tracks. 
The following facts are established by the testimony 
of plaintiff himself: The accident occurred at the inter-
section of a narrow unused dirt road with defendant's main 
line track. The trackage at the point of the accident and 
for several miles in either direction traverses isolated and 
desolate desert-like country. It was approximately 11 :30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
p. m. in the summer evening of July 18, 1955. The atmo-
sphere was clear and there was no obstruction to vision 
either up or down the track, the only limiting factor being 
the d~rkness of the night. Plaintiff and the deceased had 
decided to traverse the track by foot to find some privacy 
from the highway. Before setting out to cross the tracks, 
plaintiff had turned on his automobile lights. Both he and 
his wife knew that they would have to cross railroad tracks 
to reach a position of privacy. Plaintiff was constantly 
watching both up and down the tracks before crossing the 
passing track. After the passing track had been traversed, 
plaintiff and deceased noticed the main line track (R. 19) 
and before attempting to cross the main line, the two were 
"noticing both sides to see if the train was coming" (R. 
19). Plaintiff made it across the main line track but de-
ceased did not. 
Plaintiff's own evidence establishes that the train had 
a very bright light on front (R. 24, 49, 52). Defendant's 
witness testified that the beam of the headlight illuminated 
the track ahead for about 800 feet (R. 68). Plaintiff esti-
mated that he could see a lighted train a half-mile away 
(R. 33) . Despite the unobstructed view up the track, plain-
tiff and deceased failed to see the lighted train until it was 
upon them; nor did they hear the huge locomotive with its 
many cars (R. 19, 23, 24). The train was traveling at. the 
usual high speed at which trains are propelled in isolated 
territory. From the foregoing it seems to us manifest that 
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law and that the motion was properly granted by the 
trial judge. 
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The law pertaining to the duty of a traveler at railroad 
crossings is well defined in the decisions of our own Su-
preme Court. It is unnecessary to refer, as plaintiff has 
repeatedly done, to the summation of general law contained 
in American Jurisprudence. In Wilkinson v. Oregon Short 
Line R. Co., 35 Utah 100, 116, 99 Pac. 466, 468, the duty 
of a traveler in crossing railroad tracks was defined as 
follows: 
"The requirements of the law * * * pro-
ceed beyond the featureless generality that one must 
do his duty in this respect, or must exercise ordinary 
care under the circumstances. The law defines pre-
cisely what the term 'ordinary care under the cir-
cumstances' shall mean in these cases. In the pro-
gress of the law in this behalf the question of care 
at railway crossings, as affecting the traveler, is no 
longer, as a rule, a question for the jury. The quan-
tum of care is exactly prescribed as a matter of law. 
In attempting to cross the traveler must listen for 
signals, notice signs put up as warnings, and look 
attentively up and down the track * * * " (Em-
phasis added.) 
One of the required precautions applicable to the in-
stant case is defined by the court in the Wilkinson opinion 
as follows: 
"If a traveler, by looking, could have seen an 
app?"oaching train 1~n time to escape, it will be pre-
sumed in case he is infnred by coUision, either that 
he did not look o1·, if he did look, that he did not heed 
'luhat he san,. Such conduct is held negligence per 
se." (Emphasis added.) 
Numerous cases affirm the rule set forth in the Wilkin-
son case, supra, to the effect that a traveler who had an 
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opportunity to discover an approaching train in time to 
avoid an accident and who fails to do so, is guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law: See e. g., Butler 
v. Payne, 59 Utah 383, 203 Pac. 869; Drummond v. Union 
Pacific R. R. Co., 14 Utah 289, 117 P. 2d 903, Haarstrich v. 
0. S. L. R. Co., 70 Utah 552, 262 Pac. 100; Nuttall v. Denver 
and Rio Grande Western R. Co., 98 Utah 383, 99 P. 2d 15; 
Benson v. The Denver and Rio Grande Western R. Co., 
... Utah ... , 286 P. 2d 790. In each of the cases above cited 
it was held as a matter of law that the traveler in failing 
to see what was there to be seen was guilty of negligence 
as a matter of law. 
It also seems apparent that the time when the traveler 
is required to look is when he is about to cross the tracks. 
Our high court noted in Drummond v. Union Pacific R. R. 
Co._, 14 Utah 289, 117 P. 2d 903, (1947) that: 
"The time to look is when he is about to cross. 
That is the time when he is about to encounter the 
danger portended by a railroad crossing, and it is 
not enough that he look at a point some distance 
from the crossing, when looking on nearer approach 
would reveal danger." 
These propositions of law pose the following question: 
Could the deceased have seen defendant's locomotive had 
she looked attentively up the main track as she was about 
to cross it? The evidence compels a decisive affirmative 
answer. It would be simply incredible to suppose that a 
person in deceased's position would be unable, had she 
looked as she neared the crossing, to observe the approach 
of a huge lighted locomotive pulling a train of 13 cars, and 
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yet be struck by the train as she took her first step onto 
the track. Such a proposition would defy all known human 
experience. We submit that, as was said in the Holmgren 
case, supra, 
"The conclusion is irresistible that [deceased] 
either failed to look or having looked, failed to heed 
what [s]he saw or should have· seen [S]he must, 
therefore, be held to have be·en guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law." 
The facts of this case are very similar to those in Mingus 
v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 P. 2d 495, where the deceased 
walked from the sidewalk into a street at nighttime and 
was struck and killed by an automobile. The court said 
in that case: 
"More convincing than the direct testimony that 
deceased did not look, is the further evidence that 
deceased neither said nor did anything to indicate 
that he was at all aware of the danger presented 
by defendant's approaching automobile. He seems 
to have been wholly unaware of its approach. Cer-
tainly he did nothing either to warn his wife, or 
to rescue either himself or her from their position 
of peril. On this evidence, it must be said as a mat-
ter of law that deceased either failed to look, or hav-
ing looked, failed to see what he should have seen." 
It also seems to us manifest that deceased failed to 
listen for the approach of a train as she neared the cross-
ing. The locomotive 'vhich struck her was pulling a train 
of twelve to thirteen cars (R. 72). As the train passed 
plaintiff it made a great deal of noise (R. 35) . A pedestrian 
has a better opportunity to hear and to see approaching 
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trains and to prevent a collision than the ordinary motorist 
who sits in an automobile with the engine running and must 
look up and down the track from within his vehicle. If 
plaintiff had been listening for trains as she approached 
the crossing, it seems manifest to us that she could have 
heard the noise of defendant's locomotive before she was 
struck. 
Plaintiff does not seriously argue that deceased could 
not have seen the train had she looked, for the train was 
there to be seen and deceased was in a position to see it. 
Mr. Abdulkadir's testimony conclusively shows that the 
lighted locomotive could have been seen had deceased looked 
(R. 33). Plaintiff's position is that deceased did not have 
a duty to look as she crossed the tracks because she was 
being led across by her husband who walked ahead of her. 
It is urged that she had the same duty of care for her own 
safety as would a guest in an automobile. No cases are cited 
in support of this unique proposition and, of course, none 
can be found. If such a proposition were accepted, it might 
also be suggested that the driver of one automobile could 
rely upon the driver of another to lead him safely across 
railroad tracks. It is axiomatic in our law that an adult 
pedestrian having the normal faculties has no right to rely 
upon another to safely lead him or her across streets or 
across railroad tracks. Each person has a duty to exercise 
care for his own safety and when, as in the instant case, 
the traveler has full control of the situation, he must exer-
cise certain minimum precautions before stepping onto a 
railroad track. Plaintiff's urge that what is reasonable care 
under the circumstances is for the jury. As pointed out 
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in the foregoing cases, however, the law has defined in this 
area exactly what the traveler must do to comply with the 
standard. One of those requirements is that the traveler 
must look and listen for trains at a railroad crossing and 
see what is to be seen. 
Further, as a demurrer to the negligence of deceased, 
a halfway attempt is made by plaintiff to urge the doctrine 
of last clear chance. Last clear chance was not pleaded and 
none of the elements of the doctrine are present in the in-
stant case. Only a portion of the doctrine is quoted. The 
third element of § 480 of the Restatement which is very 
significant in this case has been omitted by plaintiff's 
counsel in the quote from the Holmgren case. This is simply 
a case of a woman stepping directly into the path of an on-
coming train. It is clear from the language of § 480, and 
the cases interpreting it, that the doctrine has no applica-
tion to such facts. Cox v. Thompson, ... Utah ... , 254 P. 
2d 1047; Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R. Co., 112 Utah 
189, 186 p. 2d 293. 
The single Utah decision cited and relied upon by 
plaintiff is Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific R. Co., 121 
Utah 37, 239 P. 2d 163. In that case the view of the traveler 
was obstructed by a freight train standing on parallel tracks 
pulling 65 cars, emitting steam and blowing a whistle. The 
defendant's streamliner was traveling twice the permitted 
speed in a busy station yard. It was snowing "quite hard" 
and independent eye witnesses definately established that 
the streamliner could not be seen until it was on the cross-
ing. The only similarity in the facts of the two cases is that 
there was more than one set of railroad tracks in each case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's own testimony clearly shows that the de-
ceased failed to look and to listen before stepping onto de-
fendant's tracks or failed to heed what was there to be seen 
and heard. We submit that the trial court properly dis-
missed the Complaint and that the decision below should 
be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR., 
for VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
& Respondent. 
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Exhibit "A" 
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